Aristotelean preservation of constitution

Series: Zeitgeist Zero Hour

Can we preserve democracy?

Chapter 2: Aristotle's Wisdom
Part 2: Aristotelean Preservation of Constitutions

Originally published: June 24, 2019
Last edited: July 1, 2019

By Michio Suginoo

Introduction

To Aristotle, political chaos—e.g. civil wars, revolution, and anarchy—is the ultimate villain. In this respect, Aristotle’s mind is intensively preoccupied with ‘the prevention of the worst case scenario’. As a result, his preoccupation—to avoid political chaos—shapes his pluralistic view about a good government: any form of constitutional order can be far much better, if not the best one, than a state of chaos. In this light, he explored possibilities to preserve any given constitution.

Precautionary Remark on ‘Class Analysis’

Before we begin, here I would like to make an important precautionary remark. Aristotle, like Socrates, used ‘class-based analysis,’ or ‘class analysis,’ in his discourse: he divided a society into several social classes—the wealthy, the poor, and the middle class, for example. To our contemporary mind, ‘class analysis’ has a strong attachment to Marxist doctrine. Nevertheless, as a historical fact, it was not Karl Marx who started ‘class analysis’. In this context, Aristotle should be deemed dissociated from Communism, simply because Aristotle does not particularly endorse it; he rather promotes individual’s active participation in political activities.

Section 1:
Aristotle’s General Principles and
Guidelines for Preservation of Constitutions

As outlined in Part 1 of Chart 2, Paradox of Equality and Aristotelean Paradox Management, based on his survey of 158 constitutions of his time, he formulated a typical mechanism of constitutional breakdown. It originates from discontent on inequality and injustice, then, gives rise to factions which progressively become conducive to an extreme form of civil strife—e.g. civil wars, revolution, and anarchy—then ultimately lead to the constitutional breakdown.

Based on his diagnosis on this typical pathology of constitutional breakdown, Aristotle applies reverse engineering to derive his general principles and guideline for the preservation of constitutions.

This section outlines the following four primary principles for the preservation of constitutions, presents his action guidelines, and makes a quick note of his view on how to preserve democracy at the end:

Principle of Justice: Pursuit of ‘Common Good’
Principle of ‘Inclusive Governance’
Principle of ‘Middle Way’ (‘the Golden Mean’)
Subordination of Laws to Constitution

Principle of Justice, Pursuit of the ‘Common Good’

In a nutshell, for Aristotle, the justice of constitution, or social justice, can be realised only through the pursuit of ‘the common good’. To distinguish ‘just’ constitutions from ‘corrupted/perverted’ ones, he applies this criterion to his discourse:

any form of constitution that pursues ‘the common good’ of society is a just constitution;
any form of constitution that pursues sectional interests of the ruling class, thus at the expense of the common good, is a corrupted one.

Here is an excerpt of his argument.

“Those forms of government which have regard to the common good are right constitutions, judged by the norm of absolute justice. But those which take account of only of the ruler’s interest are perversions, all deviation forms; they are despotic, ...” (Aristotle, Politics, 1961, p. 77: 1279a)

Principle of Inclusive Governance:

Furthermore, Aristotle asserts: the importance of all components—the rich, the middle class, and the poor—of the society. Name it the principle of inclusive governance.

“Neither form of government can exist or continue to exist without including both the rich and the poor.” (Aristotle, Politics, 1961, p. 155: 1309b)

He, nevertheless, does not present much convincing affirmative reasoning to the proposition. It seems rather his way of making concession to an undesirable necessity that exclusion of the poor would destabilise the system. When it comes to the allocation of roles in governance, although he stresses the importance of the inclusion of the poor in deliberative and judiciary functions, he specifically articulates the danger of involving the poor in executive function:

“It is dangerous for [the ordinary/the poor] to share in the highest offices of state, for their folly may lead them into error, and their dishonesty into crime. On the other hand, it is risky to exclude them from such positions: a state in which many poor men are debarred from office cannot but have numerous enemies in its midst. The only alternative is to allow them deliberative and judicial functions; and it was on these grounds that Solon and other legislators assigned to them the power of electing magistrates and calling them to account, but not the right of holding office individually. When they all meet together their discrimination is sufficiently reliable, and combined with the better class they are useful to the state; but each individual on his own is lacking in judgement.” (Aristotle, Politics, 1961, p. 84: Book III: 1281b)

He further warns, vacuum of the middle class could swell the population of the poor, thus, ultimately destabilise the system.

“In those democracies which have no middle class and the poor far outnumber the rich, trouble ensues and the state soon goes to pieces.” (Aristotle, Politics, 1961, p. 119: Book IV iii: 1296a)

This point will be emphasised later again.

Overall, Aristotle seeks a balanced distribution of three classes—the rich, the middle class, and the poor—over the allocation of roles of deliberative and judiciary functions, but not in executive power, in governance.

Principle of the Middle Way, or the Golden Mean:

As mentioned earlier, Aristotle denounces any extreme pure form of constitution—be it aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy, or tyranny. This translates into his principle of ‘the middle way,’ or ‘the golden mean’. Here, Aristotle emphasizes the importance of preventing both excesses and deficiencies:

“both excess and deficiency are characteristics of vice, and the mean of virtue.” (Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 2009, p. 31)

“there is one thing that must not be overlooked, though it is at present overlooked in constitutions that deviate – the principle of the middle way. Many steps thought of as democratic lead to the fall of a democracy, and the corresponding thing happens in oligarchies.” (Aristotle, The politics, 1992, p. 330: 1309b)

As stated in Part 1, Aristotle was applying the principle of ‘the middle way’ to managing the paradox of equality. As a courtesy reminder, while ‘the poor’ demands ‘numerical equality,’ ‘the rich’ demands ‘proportional equality.’ It provokes factions and divides the society. Rather than selecting any one of these confronting principles of equality and discarding the other, he proposes a policy mix to blend both of them and lets these two ‘diametrically opposite’ ends of social, political and economic self-interests [1] check and balance each other (Aristotle, the Politics, Book V i: 1302a).

“No form of government, however, can be satisfactory when based exclusively on wither the oligarchical or the democratic notion of equality. That much is proved by experience: no such constitution has ever survived. Why not? Because anything that originates in error is doomed to failure. The right way, therefore, is to employ in some cases the principle of numerical equality, and in others that of equality proportionate to desert.” (Aristotle, Politics, 1961, p. 135: Book V 1302a)

It is noteworthy that this paradox management also accords with ‘the principle of inclusive governance’. These principles are mutually interlinked.

Moreover, in light of the principle of ‘the middle way,’ Aristotle stresses the importance of the middle class as an anchor to balance two extremes ends of society, the wealthy and the poor. He calls it ‘a neutral arbitrator’:

“Where the middle class outnumbers both [of the rich and the poor] or only one of the extremes, a durable polity can be established. […] A neutral arbitrator enjoys more confidence than anyone else, and that is exactly what your ‘man in the middle’ is. The better the mixture of its elements, the more durable a constitution will prove to be.” (Aristotle, Politics, 1961, p. 121: Book IV vi: 1297a)

He further goes:

“In those democracies which have no middle class and the poor far outnumber the rich, trouble ensues and the state soon goes to pieces.” (Aristotle, Politics, 1961, p. 119: Book IV iii: 1296a)

As stated in the principle of inclusive governance, he warns, the destruction of the middle class would destabilise the existing constitution (political regime), since it automatically translates into an increase in the poverty of the society, thus, intensifies the mistrust, and escalates the tension between the rich and the poor. That would automatically result in the creation of factions, which is the source of civil strifes, according to Aristotle’s diagnosis. As a reminder, in Aristotle’s discourse, a typical pathology of constitutional change unfolds in the following order:

an increase in inequality,
discontent on inequality,
ensuing factions among social classes,
escalation of civil strifes, and
constitutional change.

If the government fails to address the issue, it would definitely destabilise the society and could trigger the chain reaction to subvert any existing constitution on the horizon.

Genealogy of Aristotle’s Golden Mean

Now, I would like to contemplate the genealogy of Aristotle’s principle of ‘the middle way’. It appears to me that it has its origin in the self-destructive paradox of constitution suggested by Socrates in Plato’s ‘the Republic’: for any constitution, an excess pursuit of its operating principles would destroy the constitution itself:

“excessive action in one direction usually sets up a reaction in the opposite direction. This happens in seasons, in plants, in bodies, and, last but not least, in constitutions” (Plato, 1997, p. 1174: 563e).

Socrates further reflects this notion on a particular constitution, democracy, in the following enigmatic question:

“Does the insatiable desire for freedom and the neglect of other things change this constitution and put it in need of a dictatorship?” (Plato, The Republic, 1997, p 1173: 562c)

Democracy, as it attains its extreme end, is doomed to give birth to a dictatorship to end her life. The enigmatic notion reflects Socrates’ fatalistic disposition to view the self-destructive paradox of extreme democracy as inevitable.

In contrast to the fatalistic view of Socrates, Aristotle explores an alternative—the principle of moderation, or ‘the middle way’—to manage the paradox. [click the link for the Contrast between Socrates/Plato and Aristotle]

Laws subordinate to Constitutions

In addition to these grand principles, Aristotle stresses, lawmakers need to formulate laws to actualise the justice of a correct constitution.

“laws ought to be (as in fact they always are) adapted to the constitution, and not vice versa.” (Aristotle, Politics, 1961, p. 104: 1289a)

In other words, laws that compromise the justice of a ‘correct’ constitution are corrupted, thus their flaws need to be redressed by new just laws that would embody the spirit of the constitution; otherwise, corrupted laws can impair the constitutional foundation. Once unscrupulous politicians unjustly amend laws for their advantages, it signals an omen of constitutional change.

Given that, Aristotle further characterises the importance of the enforcement of just laws as a safeguard for the stability of the given constitution

“Speaking generally, we may say that constitutions are preserved by adhering to all the legal provisions [deemed] as conducive to their stability.” (Aristotle, Politics, 1961, p. 155: Book V ix 1309b)

He expounds, obeying ‘just laws’ should not be regarded as slavery but rather as self-preservation since it would preserve the justice contemplated by the given ‘correct’ constitution. Again, here stability and order—against anarchy and chaos—preoccupy his mind.

“It is quite wrong to imagine that life subject to constitutional control is mere slavery; it is in fact salvation.” (Aristotle, Politics, 1961, p. 156: Book V ix 1309b)

He further calls for our maximum vigilance in defending the rule of laws.

“Guard against the insignificant breach of laws: Illegality creeps in unobserved.” (Aristotle, The politics, 1992, p. 323: Book V viii 1307b)

General guidelines to preserve the given constitution

Besides these grand principles, Aristotle also enumerates general action guidelines for the preservation of constitution. Among his guidelines, here I pick some of those which, I believe, would least suffer from anachronism, therefore, would be relevant today in our contemporary settings:

Strict Enforcement of Law
Prevention of the concentration of power
Prevention of corruption: institutional check on any excessively dominant social group.
Prevention of embezzlement of public-funds
Manage wealth disparity between the rich and the poor within a reasonable range. This can be seen as a corollary of the principle of inclusive governance.
Maximum alert of risks that can impair and destabilise constitutional foundations.

(Aristotle, the Politics, Book V viii: 1307-1309)

These action guidelines as well as general principles that Aristotle derived from his findings of historical constitutional breakdowns are succinct and intuitive, but rarely practiced. This suggests, the real problems lie in the implementation, not in understanding the mechanism. What makes the implementation difficult? This question leads us back to Socrates’ description of the highly corrupted psyche, or Zeitgeist, of democracy. (for more details please visit Terminal Symptom of Democracy in Ancient World)

Ironically, our discourse comes to make a paradoxical loop. We started from Socrates’ fatalism, explored Aristotelean non-deterministic approach, then finally faced difficulties in its implementation to return Socrates’ fatalism.

Section 2:
Aristotle’s prescription for the preservation of ancient democracy

Our primary concern, of course, is how to preserve democracy.

As Socrates in the Plato’s ‘The Republic’ portrayed, democracy is a political battleground between the rich and the poor and politicians play a significant acting role in creating factions within a society. As a result, the rich organise themselves to assemble an oligarchic faction within democracy. Simply put, democracy subsumes oligarchy within. In a way, democracy is a sort of a crossover multi-verse regime, in which democracy and oligarchy co-exist and competing against each other in principle.

In other words, a democratic society would face the paradox of equality: the poor favour numerical equality to have better accesses to rights, while the rich favour proportional equality to seek their privilege. (Chapter 2-Part 1: Paradox of Equality and Aristotle’s Paradox Management) Now, a relevant question would be how Aristotle resolves the paradox in an operating democracy.

For the preservation of democracy, as a reminder, here is his earlier remark about democracy:

“In those democracies which have no middle class and the poor far outnumber the rich, trouble ensues and the state soon goes to pieces.” (Aristotle, Politics, 1961, p. 119: Book IV iii: 1296a)

In democracy, vacuum of the middle class could swell the population of the poor, thus, ultimately destabilise the system.

He is particularly concerned with the progressively intensifying economic struggles of the poor as a destabilising factor of democracy. To address this issue, he prescribes a pragmatic remedy: government should support the poor to start their own business instead of providing the poor with financial supports. Business start-up assistance programs, or/and even job-skill development programs, would give the recipients an opportunity to contribute to the economy, while plain financial supports would only increase their dependence on the financial support, thus, would only drain the wealth of the state. (Aristotle, Politics, Book VI v: 1320b)

These principles and guidelines are too general and do not go into specifics. As Aristotle embraces diversity and particularity, he stresses, democracy can take more than one single form. Each form of democracy needs its own customised solution.

For those interested in covering Aristotle's original discourse on these matters comprehensively, please refer to his ‘the Politics’: particularly Chapter viii and ix of Book V for his general rules and Chapter v of Book VI particularly for the preservation of democracy.

Closing Remarks

Overall, Chapter 2, divided into Part 1 and Part 2, shaped that the ominous terminal symptom of democracy, the product of Socrates’ deterministic discourse, is not historical necessity. Aristotle’s anti-deterministic approach gives us some hope that our choice, if not free-will, could play a part in shaping the future to prevent us from falling prey to fatalism. Aristotle had a profound insight about paradoxes embedded in our social, political, and economic reality. And he illuminated some principles to manage paradoxes. His ‘paradox management’ distinguishes himself from Socrates’ fatalistic world view.

These principles and guidelines are very succinct and intuitive and appeal to our common sense. They appear to us so easy to be implemented. The problem, however, is that these simple principles are rarely fully practiced in reality. This suggests, the real problems lie in the implementation, not in understanding the mechanism. What makes the implementation difficult? This question leads us to back to Socrates’ illustration of the highly corrupted psyche, or Zeitgeist, of democracy.

What has become clear in our discourse so far based on the ancient wisdoms is paradoxical: in order to avoid fatalism, we need to understand very well the mechanism of fatalism itself. In a way, in order to deny fatalism, we need to acknowledge fatalism. Otherwise, denial—as if it did not exist—out of ‘reckless optimism’ can just take us to the road to the ominous fate.

We started from our attempt to denounce Socrates’ enigmatic fatalism; then, explored Aristotelean non-deterministic approach to seek remedies; now facing the difficulties in the implementation of Aristotle's wisdom, we ironically return to Socrates’ fatalism. Our discourse made a paradoxical loop back to Socrates’ fatalism after our journey of Aristotelean non-determinism. This is the reason why Socrates’ discourse is invaluable, while we can seek hope in Aristotle’s wisdom.

Next Chapter

When we turn to our contemporary setting, the social circumstances of our time are very different from those of Aristotle’s time in antiquity. Our own prescriptions for the preservation of democracy requires us to further incorporate specific circumstances of our time into our analysis in order to avoid anachronism. The next chapter--Chapter 3: Liberal Representative Democracy— moves on to our contemporary setting to contemplate on the preservation of democracy.

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Notes:

Note 1: The expression is borrowed from Paul Cartledge’s descriptive phrase: “the golden mean in all things--the city most likely to succeed pragmatically was the one in which the middling citizens held the political balance between the extremes of rich and poor with their diametrically opposed self-interests, although even such a city would still be operating at a level well below the optimal Aristotelian philosophical ideal.” (Cartledge, Democracy, a life, 2016, pp. 19-20)

References

Aristotle. (1961). Politics. In Aristotle, Politics and Athenian Constitution (J. Warrington, Trans.). London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd.
Aristotle. (1992). The politics. (T. A. Sinclair, & T. J. Saunders, Trans.) London: Penguin Group.
Aristotle. (2009). The Nicomachean Ethics. (D. Ross, & L. Brown, Trans.) New York: Oxford University Press Inc.
Cartledge, P. (2016). Democracy, a life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lee, D. (2007). the Republic (Opening Notes on Chapters). In Plato, Plato, the Republic. London: Penguin Books, Ltd.
Plato. (1997). The Republic. In J. M. Cooper, Plato Complete Works (G. Grube, & C. Reeve, Trans., pp. 971-1123). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
Plato. (2007). the Republic. (D. Lee, & M. Lane, Trans.) London: Penguin Books, Ltd.
Saunders, T. J. (1992). Chapter Preface. In Aristotle, The politics. London: Penguin Group.

Series: Zeitgeist Zero HourCan we preserve democracy?Chapter 2: Aristotle's WisdomPart 2: Aristotelean Preservation of Constitutions